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SELLING FAVORS IN THE LAB: 




Substantial academic interest and public policy debate centers on campaign finance reform. 
Campaign resources can provide benefits to constituencies if candidates use them to fund the 
distribution of useful information. On the other hand, voters can potentially be harmed if 
candidates trade policy favors to special interests in exchange for contributions. 
Unfortunately, because informative field data on this topic are very difficult to obtain, the 
effects of different campaign finance strategies on election outcomes and economic welfare 
remain largely uninformed by empirical analyses. This paper reports data from novel 
laboratory experiments designed to shed light on the campaign finance debate. Our 
experiment is based on a model where power-hungry candidates are motivated to trade favors 
for campaign contributions. Our data is consistent with the model’s predictions. We find that 
voters’ revise their beliefs in response to candidate advertising in a way that is consistent with 
theory. Moreover, in relation to privately financed electoral competitions, in publicly financed 
campaigns (i) high-quality candidates are elected more frequently, and (ii) margins of victory 
are larger. Both of these outcomes are predicted by theory. We conduct policy experiments on 
various campaign finance strategies, including the widely suggested caps on private 
fundraising. Our results suggest that caps can improve voter welfare but do not increase the 
likelihood that high-quality candidates will be elected. 
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Substantial academic interest, along with an increasingly passionate policy debate, 
centers on campaign finance reform. Campaign resources can provide benefits to constituencies 
if candidates use them to fund the dissemination of useful information. On the other hand, voters 
can potentially be harmed if candidates trade policy favors to special interests in exchange for 
contributions. While there has been significant theoretical progress on this topic, informative 
field data are very difficult to obtain. Consequently, the effects of different campaign finance 
strategies on election outcomes and economic welfare remain largely uninformed by empirical 
analyses. This paper reports data from novel laboratory experiments designed to shed light on 
the campaign finance debate.  
A number of theoretical models assume that campaign contributions are used in electoral 
races to provide information to voters, but that candidates obtain contributions by promising 
favors (see for example Plotters, Sloof, and van Winden 1997, Coate 2004a, 2004b and Prat 
2001, 2002).
1  Within this framework scholars analyze welfare consequences stemming from the 
introduction of campaign contribution limits (i.e. comparing the loss in information to voters to 
the gain from fewer policy favors to contributors). All of these formal theories, along with their 
attendant results, rely on assumptions regarding voters’ beliefs, and the way those beliefs change 
in light of candidates’ advertising. Unfortunately, little is known about the empirical validity of 
these theories or assumptions, a fact that is echoed in the ongoing public debate over this issue.  
U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), for example, claims that most contribution limits 
                                                           
1 Other theoretical work in this area of research that either views campaign advertising as providing information, or  
that views campaign expenditures as providing signals includes Ashworth (2003), Austen-Smith (1987), Bailey 
(2002, 2004), Baron (1994), Groseclose (2001), Schultz (2003), Abrajano and Morton (2004), and Wittman (2004a, 
2004b). Related theoretical work in this area includes Hinich and Munger (1989), Simon (2002) and Morton and 
Myerson (2003). Morton and Cameron (1992) review much of the older theoretical literature on campaign  
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amount to incumbent protection acts. Former Commissioner Bradley A. Smith (Federal Election 
Commission) similarly argues that campaign finance laws make it relatively harder for 
challengers to raise money vis-à-vis incumbents (Smith 1995). On the other hand, those who 
favor contribution limits claim that they level the playing field, and reduce both actual and 
apparent corruption.  
Indirect evidence regarding the welfare consequences of campaign policies can be drawn 
from previous research with field data. For example, the literature linking campaign spending to 
vote shares hints at welfare effects, but does not provide a direct test of the effect of campaign 
finance restrictions. Work in this area includes, e.g., Jacobson (1980, 1985, 1989, 1997), 
Abramowitz (1988), Green and Krasno (1988), Levitt (1994) and Gerber (1998). Also, 
Stratmann (2004) reports data that suggest the effectiveness of campaign spending depends on 
whether states have campaign contributions caps, but he is also unable to offer direct evidence 
on any associated welfare consequences. 
Direct field comparisons of welfare effects of different campaign finance policies are 
extremely difficult to accomplish. It is for this reason that, despite its evident academic interest 
and public policy importance, no comparative empirical analysis of the welfare implications of 
different campaign finance policies has yet appeared.  The reason for the difficulty is that the net 
benefit of different policies depends crucially on the way voters’ decisions are affected by costly 
advertising under different campaign finance programs. Direct inferences about this type of voter 
behavior would seem to require (i) individual-level observations on number of ads seen and 
voting decisions, and (ii) observations from at least two states (or counties or other political 
units) that are very similar outside of their campaign finance policies. In our experience, data of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
expenditures.  
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this sort are unavailable.  
The importance of the topic, along with the severe limitations in using field data to 
explore it, motivates us to pursue an experimental approach. In a laboratory campaign 
contribution rules are treatment variables, candidate’s qualities are known and voters’ decisions 
are fully observable. Consequently, direct inferences regarding comparative welfare effects are 
possible.  
To discipline our experiment’s design we looked to previous theoretical research on 
contribution limits. In the end, much of our design reflects an environment developed by Coate 
(2004a). A reason for this choice is that Coate’s model makes stark and testable predictions that 
certain campaign policies have Pareto improving welfare effects. However, it is important to 
emphasize that our data inform more than just Coate’s model. Indeed, our environment shares 
key features with many well-known formal models, particularly the models cited above, in which 
voters are assumed to revise their beliefs in response to candidate advertising. Our experiment 
informs such formal theory, in that our data provide evidence on the nature and consequences of 
voter belief updating, as well as how such updating differs among various campaign finance 
institutions. These issues have not been analyzed experimentally previously, and we provide a 
novel experimental design for this purpose.
2 
In our experiment power-hungry candidates run for office, and voters vote for their 
preferred candidate. Candidates can obtain contributions in one treatment though a quid-pro-quo 
with interest groups, and in another treatment though public financing. Our findings lend support 
to formal theory, in the sense that voters in our laboratory campaigns update their beliefs in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
2 Of course, many experiments test theories in both individual and strategic decision making environments (see, e.g., 
Houser, et. al. (2004) for the former, and Kurzban and Houser (2005) and Houser and Kurzban (2002) for the latter.)   
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direction predicted by the rationality assumptions typically incorporated into theoretical political 
economy models (such as those cited above).  In particular, we find strong evidence that the 
effectiveness of campaign advertising, and consequently electoral outcomes and voter welfare, 
depend on voters’ beliefs regarding the degree to which a campaign was financed with monies 
obtained though a quid-pro-quo. Our empirical confirmation of the substantive importance of 
campaign finance policy leads us to design experiments to investigate welfare effects of 
frequently suggested campaign policies including contribution caps and public matching funds. 
We report the results of these experiments in section IV below. 
 
II. A Political Competition Model 
We here detail a model that illuminates the trade-offs associated with certain forms of 
campaign finance policy. As noted above, this model is drawn from Coate (2004a). The model 
provides testable predictions with respect to the effect of contribution limits on the closeness of 
electoral races, and how voters react when faced with campaign advertising under different 
campaign finance regimes. Our experiment then provides data that tests these predictions.  
The model assumes a first-past-the-post electoral rule, two candidates, and a 
one-dimensional policy space. Voters (and contributors) seek to bring about the feasible outcome 
that maximizes their respective utilities. Voters are either leftist, rightist, or swing voters. Swing 
voters are symmetrically distributed around the median of the one-dimensional space, with leftist 
voters to the left, and rightist voters positioned to the right. Swing voters are either left-leaning 
or right-leaning.  
There are two parties and each party selects a candidate. Candidates are citizens and have 
fixed ideologies. The leftist party selects a candidate from leftist voters and the rightist party  
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selects a candidate from rightist voters. There are an equal number of rightist and leftist voters, 
and the platforms of candidates reflect their parties’ positions. In addition to their positions, 
candidates are characterized by their types. A candidate is either a "high quality" or "low 
quality" type, reflecting the idea that parties cannot always find a high quality person to serve as 
their candidate. In the model, parties choose the candidate’s type with an exogenous probability. 
The type captures a candidate's innate characteristics, such as competence, the quality of his past 
performance and valence, including personal characteristics like integrity. 
A leftist voter will always vote for a candidate from the leftist party, regardless of his 
type. Similarly, a rightist voter will always vote for a candidate from the rightist party. Swing 
voters differ in their ideal points because some swing voters are left-leaning while others are 
right-leaning.  Swing voters’ preferences are homogeneous with respect to candidate quality and 
valence. They prefer a competent politician and a politician with integrity over a politician 
without such characteristics and tend to vote for the qualified candidate.  However, they are 
"rationally ignorant" and thus have little knowledge of whether candidates are of high or low 
quality.  Each swing voter has beliefs about the likelihood that candidates are qualified. In the 
absence of information on candidate quality, left (right) leaning swing voters will vote for the 
candidate from the leftist (rightist) candidate. 
There are two interest groups. The leftist group contributes to the leftist candidate and the 
rightist group contributes to the rightist candidate, and interest groups observe the quality of their 
own party’s candidate but not the quality of the opposing party’s candidate. Candidates use the 
contributions for campaign advertising.  Advertising is truthful, meaning that candidates 
advertise their own records and characteristics and cannot lie about their past records and  
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characteristics.
3 Advertising is beneficial for the high quality candidate because it may induce 
some swing voters to change their votes. The low quality candidate will not advertise since this 
will only reduce the chances of election. 
Since party extremists will always vote for their candidate, the outcome of the election is 
determined by the behavior of swing voters. For example, in equilibrium a left-leaning swing 
voter faces four possibilities: i) he has not seen the advertisement from either party’s candidate, 
ii) he has seen the advertisement from both party’s candidates, iii) he has seen the leftist party’s 
advertisement but not the rightist party’s advertisement, and iv) he has seen the rightist party’s 
advertisement but not the leftist party’s advertisement. In the first three cases he will vote for the 
leftist party.  In the last case he might vote for the rightist candidate. He knows that the rightist 
candidate is qualified, but he is uncertain about the leftist candidate. Whether he will vote for the 
rightist candidate depends on how likely he thinks it is that the rightist candidate is qualified and 
on his idiosyncratic preferences to vote for the leftist candidate. In equilibrium, some fraction of 
left-leaning swing votes in situation (iv) will switch to their vote to the rightist candidate. 
Coate adds the critical assumption that candidates obtain contributions by promising 
policy favors to the contributors.
4  Policy favors decrease the utility of voters. In this case left 
leaning swing voters in (iv) are less likely to switch their vote to the rightist candidate because 
they know that the right candidate promised at least some favors to the interest group in 
exchange for obtaining campaign funds.  Thus, promising favors to contributors can be costly to 
candidates. Had fewer favors been sold, the campaign message would have been more 
                                                           
3 One rationale for this assumption is that news media have incentives to reveal when an advertisement is not 
truthful, and this provides incentives for candidates to air credible advertisements. 
4 Supporting evidence for the assumption of a quid-pro-quo between legislators and interest groups has been 
provided in a number of studies, including Stratmann (1998, 2002).  Additional theoretical work in this area includes 
Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996, 2001).  
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convincing and the probability that the voter would switch his vote to the advertising candidate 
would have been higher.   
In Coate’s (2004a) model, the margin of victory between the high and low quality 
candidates diminishes (relative to the case where advertising is purely informative and no favor 
trading has taken place) because voters know about the quid pro quo and thus become cynical 
about candidates because even qualified candidates sell favors. This makes advertising less 
effective. With unrestricted contributions and unrestricted favor selling (candidates are infinitely 
power hungry), the informational value of advertisements becomes very small, and contribution 
limits could increase the high quality candidate’s vote share. 
This model also provides testable implications regarding the effect of publicly versus 
privately financed political campaign.  The model predicts that relative to privately financed 
campaigns, publicly financed campaigns increase the high quality candidate’s chance of winning 
the election, and this is the source of the welfare improvements that Coate ties to publicly 
financed campaigns. Public advertising is the case of purely informative advertising. No 
promises have to be made to contributors when advertising is paid by taxpayers.   
Finally, this model provides testable implications regarding the effect of campaign 
contribution limits on the closeness of elections.  Dollar limits on contributions can reduce the 
number of policy favors candidates promise to interest groups. While campaign contribution 
limits result in less campaign spending
5 and reduce voters’ information about their voting 
options, limits may decrease the number of favors candidates promise to contributors.  The 
probability that a voter will switch his vote to the advertising candidate will increase with limits 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
5 Coate’s (2004) model assumes that contribution limits translate into fewer overall contributions raised and thus 
into lower campaign expenditures.  
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if the beneficial effects of limits, i.e. fewer policy favor promises, outweigh the negative effects 
of information loss (Coate 2004a). 
 
III. Experiment Design 
Overview 
Our experiment is implemented entirely on computers using software we created 
specifically for campaign finance experiments. After subjects are seated in the laboratory, all 
advertising and voting are accomplished through the software. Instructions for our experiment 
are also computerized. A transcript of the instructions can be found in the appendix.  
Our experimental design is guided by the model described in Section II. To summarize 
the above, key features of that model are:  
•  There are two political parties representing opposing ideologies. 
•  One candidate represents each party, and each candidate might be high or low quality. 
•  Candidates always prefer to be elected. 
•  “Swing” voters might vote for a candidate outside of their own party, if they believe that 
candidate is sufficiently qualified. 
•  Voters know each candidate’s party, but not whether he/she is qualified. 
•  Advertising provides truthful information about a candidate’s quality. 
•  Resources for advertising are obtained from interest groups for whom elected candidates 
are able to provide favors, so that larger contributions can be exchanged for increased 
promises of (conditional) favors. 
A broad characterization our experiment is as follows. Each session includes multiple 
rounds. In each round, two subjects are chosen at random to be candidates, one for each party.  
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Half of the remaining subjects, the voters, are randomly assigned to each party (experiments are 
always run with an even number of subjects.) Political parties are represented by “triangle” or 
“circle”, and quality by “striped” or “solid”. One candidate is randomly assigned to be “solid,” 
and the other “striped.” Subjects’ incentives are structured so that all voters are swing voters: all 
prefer striped shading to solid shading, but within a shading prefer a candidate of their own 
party.  
Voters know the party of each candidate (triangle or circle) but not their shading (solid or 
striped.) During campaigns candidates purchase advertisements that provide truthful information 
to voters about his/her shading. Each purchased advertisement reaches exactly one randomly 
chosen subject. After the campaign voters cast a vote for exactly one candidate. 
Rather than modeling interest groups directly, in our experiment candidates use tokens to 
purchase advertisements. The crux of our experiment is that tokens come in different colors, red 
and blue, with blue tokens costly to voters if the elected candidate used them to buy 
advertisements. Red tokens are never costly to voters. Loosely speaking, the idea is that 
candidates who use blue tokens have financed their advertising by selling favors, while 
candidates who use red have financed with “clean” public money.  
Some experimental treatments include only red tokens, while in others only blue tokens 
are available. Both voters and candidates know the nature of each treatment and when they are in 
each treatment. For example, all subjects are told when they will participate in an “only blue” 
treatment, and all subjects understand that this means that any advertising is accomplished with 
only blue tokens.  Comparing electoral outcomes across treatments provides a simple and direct 
way to assess the effect of various types of campaign finance policies.   
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  It is important to point out that although our subjects are provided substantial information 
about each treatment, they nevertheless have less knowledge than agents in the model sketched 
in Section II above.. In particular, in that model agents have correct beliefs (in equilibrium) 
about the amount of high quality candidate spending. In our experiment, subjects face 
uncertainty with respect to the amount of high quality candidate spending: they must draw 
inferences about this quantity based on the number of ads they receive. Consequently, subjects’ 
behavior in our experiments should be sensitive to number of ads seen, while in Coate’s model 






Voters’ payoffs are determined by (i) the party of the elected candidate; (ii) the shading 
of the elected candidate; and (iii) the number of blue tokens used by the winning candidate to 
purchase advertisements. Ignoring for the moment the cost of blue tokens, let P(x, y) denote the 
baseline payoff to a voter if a candidate of party “x” and shading “y” is elected. Then the payoff 
structure is P(own party, striped) = 7.5 > P(other party, striped) = 7.0 > P(own party, solid) = 5.0 
> P(other party, solid) = 4.5. Each of these payoffs is expressed in experimental points, which 
are converted at a known exchange rate (three to one) to US dollars at the end of the experiment.  
As pointed out above, the voter payoff structure ensures that all voters in our experiment are 
“swing” voters, in the sense that they always prefer a striped to solid candidate, although within 
                                                           
6 In an extended footnote, Coate sketches a framework within which number of ads seen matters: voters draw 
inferences about how power hungry a candidate is based on the number of ads they have seen (Coate, 2004a, fn. 22, 
pp. 642-3). This is essentially what subjects in our experiment must do.    
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shadings voters prefer a candidate from their own party.  
Although voters are not explicitly told the color of the token used to buy a given 
advertisement, they are given complete information about each treatment. For example, voters 
know if only blue tokens are available for candidates to buy advertising. The use of blue tokens 
can reduce voters’ earnings, while red tokens never reduce voters’ earnings. In particular, 0.5 
points are deducted from each voter’s earnings for every blue token used by a winning candidate. 
Consequently, total earnings for each voter, if a candidate of party x and shading y is elected and 
used N blue tokens and M red tokens to advertise, is given by P(x,y) – N(blue)/2 – 0*M(red). 
Note that voters will lose experimental points if they elect a candidate who used more 
than 15 blue tokens to purchase advertising. Losses carry over to subsequent rounds, but subjects 
are aware that earnings over the entire experiment are bounded below by zero. 
 
Candidates’ Earnings 
Candidates earn 15 experimental points if they win an election. Candidates are charged 
0.1 points to buy an advertisement, regardless of the token’s color. That is, both blue and red 
tokens are costly to candidates. However, candidates do not incur the 0.5 point cost per blue 
token they use if they are elected. The reason is that we want candidates to be strongly motivated 
to win the election, regardless of the amount of advertising that they do or the way it is financed. 
With regard to Coate’s model, one can interpret this as ensuring that our candidates are “power 
hungry.” Moreover, candidates do not incur the blue token cost if the other candidate is elected. 
The reason is that we did not want candidates to enter cooperative agreements not to advertise, 
or to advertise little, in order to avoid this cost. Candidates’ earnings E are therefore calculated 
by the formula:  
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E = I(win the election)*15 – 0.1*(Number of advertisements purchased.) 
Note that non-winning candidates who purchase advertisements will lose experimental points.  
 
Campaigning 
Each campaign lasts for one minute. During that minute candidates can use tokens to 
purchase advertisements. Exactly one subject receives each advertisement, and this subject is 
drawn randomly from the entire set of participants. Consequently, during any campaign some 
subjects might see more than one advertisement, while others see none. In addition, candidates 
can receive each other’s ads, and candidates can receive their own ads. Candidates know how 
many ads they have sent, and know the color of the tokens used to purchase ads, but do not know 
anything about the voters who have received their ads. This eliminates the possibility of 
“targeted” advertising. Figures A1 and A2 display what candidates and voters see during the 
campaigning phase of each round in the experiment.13 
Figure A1 
Example of Screen Voters See During Campaign 
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Figure A2 




Example of Voting Screen 
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Voting 
Voting immediately follows campaigning. Within 30 seconds of the end of the campaign 
voters must cast a vote for one of the candidates. Voting is mandatory. During the voting phase 
the screen reminds subjects of the number of ads from each candidate that they have seen. Figure 
A3 displays the screen subjects see during voting. 
 
Implementation 
Subjects are recruited using the automated recruiting system in place at the 
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University. After arriving 
subjects provide written consent to participate in the experiment, and are instructed that no 
communication is allowed once the experiment has begun. Subjects are escorted into the 
laboratory and seated at a desk that is separated from other desks by high partitions. Once seated, 
subjects complete electronic instructions that include an interactive quiz. Subjects who answer 
sufficiently many questions incorrectly are approached by the experimenter and appropriately 
assisted.  
After all subjects have successfully completed the instructions, they are acquainted with 
the software interface by running through a non-interactive demonstration version of each 
possible scenario: candidate campaigning, voter during campaign, and voting. Subjects are told 
at this time that mouse-clicking is not necessary during the experiment: all necessary decisions 
can be executed via “mouse-over.” That is, to execute a decision a subject need only move the 
cursor over an appropriate area on the screen that corresponds to that action. Eliminating 
clicking is necessary because we needed to eliminate all information, outside of receiving an 
advertisement, regarding the amount of candidate activity during campaigns. In addition, using  
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mouse-overs eliminates an annoying source of laboratory noise.  
After completing the instructions and non-interactive demonstration, subjects practice 
two interactive campaigns. No money is earned during the practice rounds. The practice rounds 
give subjects a chance to see how the experiment actually works, and to ask any final questions 
that might arise as a result of this exposure.  
After the instructions, demonstration and practice subjects begin money rounds. At the 
beginning of each round subjects are informed as to the conditions of that round. For example, 
they will be told that the next campaign will include only blue tokens. At the round’s beginning 
subjects are also informed what role they will play in that round: voter or candidate, party 
affiliation and, if a candidate, whether they are solid or stripes. Although candidates are chosen 
randomly each round, this randomization is constrained so that no subject can be a candidate 
twice before all subjects are candidates at least once.  
At the end of each round a results screen describes for each subject the outcome of the 
election, the amount he/she earned, and the cumulative amount that he/she has earned over the 
course of the experiment. Subjects are not told how many campaigns will be included in the 
experiment, nor are they informed as to the distribution of treatments. 
 
IV. Results 
We report data from eight experimental sessions, each of which included either 24 or 26 
subjects. Each of these sessions included between eight and fifteen campaigns. This provided a 
total of 2,509 observations on the voting decisions of 194 subjects. Subjects were paid privately 
at the end of each experimental session, which lasted about two hours. Subjects earned about $35 
on average. The inferences that we report are based on panel data estimation procedures that  
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control for both subject and session effects.  
The hypotheses that motivated our investigation revolve around the way in which voters 
respond to candidates’ advertising in different treatments. Within any campaign, any given 
voter’s decision can depend on (i) her party affiliation; (ii) the number of ads that she received 
from each candidate and (iii) the information provided by the ads she saw. As a practical matter, 
the number of low-quality candidate advertisements was very low, and we will exclude from our 
analysis those cases where a subject saw an ad from a low quality candidate. Consequently, a 
voter’s decision can be modeled as a function of both her party, as well as the number of ads that 
she received from the high quality candidate. To be precise, consider the case that a voter with 
party affiliation L receives two ads from the high quality candidate who is party R. Then the 
probability that this L voter casts a vote for the high quality R candidate can be written: 
Pr( (2) ( )) LH VC R f .    
Here,  (2) L V indicates that voter V of party L has received 2 ads from the high quality candidate, 
and f indicates “will vote for”, and  () H CR  denotes that the high quality candidate is affiliated 
with the R party.  
Now, suppose that a high quality candidate affiliated with the R party advertised n times 
during a campaign. Extending the notation above, the probability that a randomly selected voter 
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The first line on the right hand side of (1) is the probability that the randomly selected 
voter is affiliated with the R party, and has received zero advertisements, and will vote for the 
candidate of the R party. The second line is the same, except that the randomly selected voter has 
received one advertisement, and similarly for the remaining six lines.  
Although the notation has been suppressed, each type of campaign is associated with its 
own equation (1). It is easy to show that if we can determine each of the 24 probabilities that 
enter each treatment’s equation (1), then we will be able to inform all of the hypotheses of 
interest. For example, note that the first probability in each line of (1) reflects the way voters 
update their beliefs in the face of advertisements. The model sketched in Section II requires these 
probabilities to be different in different types of campaigns, and in particular ways. In particular, 
that model implies that in publicly financed campaigns the probability that a voter will vote for 
the high quality candidate, conditional on seeing multiple ads from that candidate, would be near 
one. This would not be the case in the blue campaigns, where sophisticated voters should be less 
willing to vote for a high quality candidate from whom they have seen frequent advertisements.  
The design of our experiment enables us to quickly determine the second two 
probabilities on each line. These quantities will be the same for each treatment. For example, if  
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there are 26 subjects and 12 voters in each party then Pr( ) R V  is 12/26. Similarly, because each 
ad reaches exactly one person, and that one person is drawn randomly from the population of 
subjects, we can use numerical procedures to quickly calculate how the number of ads sent 
affects the expected fraction of subjects who will receive 0, 1, 2 or more ads. These probabilities 
are provided in Table A1.  
The first probability on each line of (1) is not determined by our design, but rather by 
subjects’ decisions in each treatment. The challenge is to estimate these quantities from the 
available data. It is clear these quantities are identified. For example, to estimate the probability 
that a triangle voter who has seen zero ads would vote for a circle candidate, one could simply 
find the frequency in the data that this occurred. However, this simple frequency calculation 
would not take account of the panel structure of the data, which leads to well-known difficulties 
in interpreting the precision of the estimates.  
An alternative approach, and the one that we pursue, estimates these quantities within a 
panel data framework. In particular, we estimate each probability that enters (1) separately for 
each treatment using a mixed effects probit where the dependent variable is the decision to vote 
for the high quality candidate, and the independent variables are the number of ads received. We 
include random individual effects and fixed effects for sessions. We exclude from our analysis 
all cases where a subject received any ads from a low quality candidate. The reason is that we 
are interested in the link between high quality advertising and voting outcomes, and this link is 
obscured in those cases where the low quality candidate advertises. Ads from the low quality 
candidate were seen by 118 (not necessarily unique) voters, leaving us with 2,391 observed 
voting decisions upon which to base our analysis. 
Our estimates of the effect of advertising on the probability of switch-voting for high and  
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low quality candidates are detailed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. All of the estimates include 
random subject effects. In all cases but one we included fixed session effects.
7 The included 
regressors varied depending on empirical identification issues. In the case of Blue campaigns, we 
have enough variation in the data to obtain separate inference regarding the effects on voters of 
receiving one, two or more than two ads. As we will discuss below, in Blue Cap campaigns the 
amount of advertising was restricted and consequently there were few cases where subjects saw 
more than one advertisement. Accordingly, we draw inference about the effect of seeing “at least 
one” advertisement. We do the same for Red campaigns, but for a different reason. In this case 
the behavior was nearly identical regardless of the number of ads seen (they just voted for the 
high quality candidate as soon as that information was revealed), and the appropriate model was 
one that included only a single regressor to summarize the effect of advertising.  
A casual inspection of the Tables quickly reveals that while switch voting for the high 
quality candidate is affected by advertising in all cases, it is only in Blue campaigns where 
switch voting for the low quality candidate is substantially effected by advertising. To 
understand this, note that the probability of voting for your own party in the absence of seeing 
advertisements is about 95% in all cases. Hence, advertising can only have a visible effect (in 
our relatively small sample) in one direction: it must reduce the chance that a voter will cast her 
ballot for her own party’s high quality candidate. So, Table 2 immediately reveals that seeing 
own-party ads in Blue campaigns reduces the chance of voting for that candidate, while it has a 
statistically weaker effect in all other cases, and essentially no effect in Red and Matching 
campaigns.   
The coefficients in Tables 1 and 2 can be difficult to interpret. Consequently, we used the 
                                                           
7 The exception occurs in Red campaigns when we examine the effect of ads on switch-voting for the low quality  
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point estimates reported in those tables to create Figure 1, which provides a convenient graphical 
depiction of the relevant implications of our estimates. Consider for now only the Blue and Red 
campaigns. Panel (a) describes the probability that a high quality candidate will receive a vote 
from someone of their own party, conditional on the number of ads the voter has seen from that 
high quality candidate. As noted above, if no advertisement is received, so that the voter has no 
information regarding which candidate is high quality, there is a 95% chance that the voter will 
cast her vote for the candidate of her own party, and this is true in both the Red and Blue 
treatments. The baseline 5% switch rate could reflect “hunches” or might be due to errors.  
The effect of received ads on vote probabilities varies, however, between the Red and 
Blue campaigns. In Red campaigns, a voter who receives one or more ads from an own-party 
high quality candidate will cast their vote for that candidate with near probability one. But in 
Blue campaigns, the probability that a voter casts their ballot for an own-party high quality 
candidate declines with the number of ads that she has received. In fact, if she receives three or 
more ads, there is less than a 40% chance that they will cast their ballot for that candidate. This 
difference between the Blue and Red campaigns is statistically significant, and lies in direction 
predicted by Section II’s model.  
Voters’ reactions to advertisements in Red campaigns are optimal, in the sense that they 
vote for high quality candidates after receiving their ads. Voters’ reactions in Blue campaigns are 
in the direction predicted by theory, but there is a sense in which they do not move quickly 
enough away from their own candidate. In particular, a simple calculation reveals that there is 
only about a 4% chance that a single voter (out of 24) could have received two ads from a single 
candidate who advertised less than six times. Consequently, in our environment receiving two 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
candidate. This almost never occurs: the variation in the data is not substantial enough to identify session effects.  
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ads from a candidate is a very strong signal that they have advertised more than five times, 
which would leave any non-advertising candidate an expected earnings maximizing choice. The 
fact that voters do not strongly defect from their own candidate might suggest that they are 
pessimistic about the advertising by a candidate about whom they have no information, or that 
they are optimistic about the behavior of their own party’s candidate, or that they are confused 
about the probability implications of receiving more than one ad from a single candidate.  
Panel (b) in Figure 1 describes how the probability that a voter will support an other-
party high quality candidate varies the number of ads received from that candidate. In Red 
campaigns, voters who receive at least one add from an other-party high quality candidate will 
actually vote for that candidate with probability 0.95, which is consistent with earnings 
maximizing behavior. In blue campaigns the probability is 47% conditional on receiving one or 
more ads. Again then, the probability of switch voting is different between Red and Blue 
campaigns, and in a way that is consistent with Section II’s model of political competition.  
We next detail the welfare and electoral outcome implications of this voter behavior. 
 
IV.1. Campaign Finance Policy Effects on Electoral Outcomes and Welfare 
Result 1: In Red treatments the high quality candidate lost the election only once out of 18 
campaigns, and in that case the candidate did not advertise.  The high quality candidate in blue 
campaigns lost seven of 32 campaigns, and in six of those cases there was positive advertising.  
Note also that the high quality candidate tied in one red campaign with positive 
advertising. The outcome was also a tie in six blue campaigns, all of which included positive 
advertising. The next finding extends Result 1. 
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Result 2: Greater advertising leads to greater margins of victory in Red campaigns. Advertising 
is effective in Blue campaigns, but the margin of victory is non-monotonic in the number of ads.  
This is made clear in Figure 2. This figure plots the relationship between margin of 
victory and voting as implied by the estimates of equation (1), along with the actual data from 
the experiment. Although the estimates of equation (1) imply that advertising is always expected 
to result in a positive margin of victory (at least for advertising in the range we observed), this 
margin is expected to be much smaller in Blue than in Red campaigns. Indeed, the expected 
margin of victory is non-monotonic in advertising in Blue campaigns. It achieves a maximum of 
about four votes with 25 ads, but diminishes to two votes when 50 ads are sent. This is reflected 
by the actual data from the experiment (which of course underlie the estimates the parameters of 
equation (1).) Among all 32 Blue campaigns, the actual margin of victory never exceeded 10 
votes, and achieved this level only once. The next highest margin of victory was six, achieved 
only three times. Moreover, higher advertising clearly does not help much in Blue campaigns: in 
one case a high-quality candidate advertised 49 times but achieved a margin of victory of only 
four votes.  
   In contrast, the expected margin of victory in Red campaigns is strictly increasing in 
advertising. Among the actual Red campaigns the greatest margin of victory was 18, and this 
occurred in a case where the number of ads sent was 48. Unlike Blue campaigns, excessive 
advertising is apparently not viewed negatively by voters in Red campaigns. 
 
Result 3: In both Blue and Red campaigns, the number of switch-party votes received by a 
candidate is positively correlated with the number of ads the candidate sends.  
This result is apparent from Figure 3. Panel (a) reflects behavior in Blue campaigns, and  
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panel (b) Red campaigns. In both panels the vertical axis is the number of switch votes for the 
high quality candidate, and the horizontal axis is the number of ads. In Red campaigns, where 
advertising is not costly to voters, we saw above that essentially all voters who receive an ad 
from the high quality candidate are expected to vote for that candidate. In Blue campaigns the 
link is less strong but still positive. Among the actual campaigns, Figure 3 shows that the 
maximum number of switch votes for the high quality candidate is six in Blue campaigns, and 
nine in Red campaigns. The simple correlations between number of ads and switch votes are 
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Result 4: In Blue campaigns, number of advertisements is positively related to number of own-
party votes against the high quality candidate. There is no evidence of this in Red campaigns.  
This result says that, in Blue campaigns, a high quality candidate will lose some of his 
own party voters if he advertises too often, but that this does not happen in Red campaigns. This 
finding is easily seen in Figure 3. This provides the explanation for the simultaneous findings 
that margins of victory are not tightly connected to number of ads in Blue campaigns, while 
switch voting for the high quality candidate is. We see from Figure 3, and also the estimates of 
equation (1) for Blue campaigns as reported in Figure 1, that greater advertising in Blue 
campaigns brings with it the risk that some own-party voters can receive multiple ads, and 
consequently become concerned that too much advertising is being purchased with “dirty” 
money. In actual Red campaigns this never occurred more than twice. On the other hand, in one 
Blue campaign that included 30 ads, six of that high quality candidate’s own-party voters cast a 
ballot against him. This effect attenuates the margin of victory that high quality candidates in 
Blue campaigns can achieve. 
 
Result 5: The ex-post socially optimal outcome was achieved 89% of the time in Red campaigns, 
but only 69% of the time in the Blue campaigns.  
Figure 4 describes this result. Here, the social benefit is calculated after the campaign 
phase is completed, and is defined as the post-campaign value of electing the qualified candidate 
minus the post-campaign value of electing the unqualified candidate. In both cases, “value” is 
determined by aggregating subjects’ earnings in the event of a candidate’s election. In Blue 
campaigns where the high quality candidate has advertised six or more times this difference will  
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be negative. This difference will never be negative in Red campaigns. Note that, for the purpose 
of this calculation, campaigns that end in a tie are not considered to have achieved the socially 
optimal outcome. This result is consistent with Section II’s model: there is an expected social 
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IV.2. Policy Experiments 
While both experimental and theoretical evidence indicate that campaigns financed 
entirely by special interests are not appealing, neither is it necessarily practical to implement full 
public funding of campaigns. However, these baseline environments are on opposing ends of a 
wide spectrum of possible campaign finance strategies. In this section we report results from 
experiments designed to examine the welfare implications of two widely suggested campaign 
finance policies. In the first we impose spending caps on a fully special interest funded 
campaign. In the second we consider the case of public matching funds.  
 
IV.2.a. Spending Caps 
We implemented spending caps by restricting candidates in Blue campaigns to 
advertising at most five times. We chose five because that is the maximum number of ads that a 
high quality candidate in a Blue campaign can buy and still be the ex-post socially preferred 
choice. Both candidates and voters were aware when they were in this treatment. 
Spending caps can be effective, in the sense that the right candidate is elected, if voters 
are sophisticated enough to recognize that they should definitely vote for a high quality 
candidate whose advertisement they receive. That is, one would like voters to respond to ads 
from high quality candidates in Cap treatments in the same way that they do in Red campaigns. 
We found, however, that voter behavior in Blue Cap campaigns was statistically identical to 
voter behavior in Blue campaigns. In particular, Figure 1 reveals that the estimated equation (1) 
for Cap campaigns is essentially identical to the analogous estimates for Blue campaigns. That 
is, voters who receive ads from the high quality candidate in the Cap campaigns are no more 
likely to vote for that candidate than they would be in the Blue campaigns.   
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Overall then, the effects of spending caps are mixed. An advantage of caps is that, by 
construction, an elected high quality candidate will always provide positive social benefit. This 
is of course not the case in unrestricted special interest campaigns, where the elected candidate 
can provide negative social welfare. On the other hand, voters might not respond to advertising 
in Cap campaigns any differently than they do in regular special interest campaigns. In this 
event, the ex-post optimal, high quality candidate will be elected rather infrequently. In the case 
of our experiment, it was only about half of the time. 
 
IV.2.b. Matching Funds  
In this treatment we did not restrict the amount of candidate advertising. Instead, we 
provided candidates with one Red token for every Blue token that they used to buy an 
advertisement. That is, special interest funds were matched by public money one-to-one. Again, 
both voters and candidates were given full information about the nature of this treatment.  
For matching funds to be effective it is necessary that candidates exercise some 
constraint in their spending, and also that voters are willing to treat matching campaigns more 
like Red campaigns than Blue campaigns. In fact, candidates did not always exercise restraint in 
their advertising, and subjects did not seem to change their decision behavior much from Blue 
campaigns (see Figure 1). As a result, out of 16 total campaigns, the ex-post optimal candidate 
was elected 11 times, but a socially less-preferred candidate was elected still twice. 
The right candidate was elected more frequently in the matching treatment, but this 
treatment also includes the risk that the candidate will over-advertise and, if elected, provide a 
social cost. A matching treatment with caps (e.g., at most five blue tokens and five red tokens 
can be spent) would allow a high quality candidate to distribute information, and likely be  
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Campaign finance is a leading topic in contemporary public policy debate. Theoretical 
work in this area has been vigorous and substantial progress has been made. In contrast, 
comparative empirical analyses of campaign finance policies, and especially their effects on 
welfare and electoral outcomes, have been slow to emerge due to lack of informative field data. 
This paper reported data from a laboratory investigation of campaign finance policy. Our 
experiment is disciplined by and complements formal theory on this topic.  
One of our key results is that voters update their beliefs in a way that is consistent with 
theory. In particular, when campaigns are publicly financed, voters cast their ballot for the high 
quality candidate, regardless of the number of ads from that candidate that they have seen. This 
is not the case when campaigns are financed by quid-pro-quo special interest contributions.  In 
these cases, voters of a high quality candidate’s own party will often cast their ballot for an 
alternative, lower quality candidate when they have seen many of the high quality candidate’s 
advertisements. In addition, voters from the opposition party will switch to the high quality 
candidate when they have seen that candidate’s advertisement.  These data indicate that voter 
belief revision is in the direction predicted by formal theory, and suggests that theory does not 
necessarily place unreasonable demands on behavior.  
We pointed out that, in our environment, receiving two ads from the same candidate 
during a “quid-pro-quo” campaign is a strong signal that the candidate has over-advertised, 
leaving the other candidate as the earnings maximizing choice. However, while we noted that  
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voters change decisions in this direction, we also showed that they do not do so in a strong 
enough way. Consequently, heavily advertising high quality candidates with significant special-
interest obligations are frequently elected. As a result, voter welfare in our environment would 
be higher if candidates faced spending caps.  It is interesting to note that voters in a number of 
states, including Arizona, Nevada, California, Colorado, and Oregon, have voted on initiatives to 
limit campaign contributions. In the naturally occurring world, voters might recognize that they 
could benefit from caps. 
Our laboratory campaigns included a relatively large number of subjects making 
decisions via sophisticated software that we developed specifically to study topics in political 
competition.
8  Our software is flexible, and accommodates many potentially fruitful extensions of 
our design.  One interesting possibility is to relax the restriction that only positive advertising is 
allowed, and to incorporate negative advertising. We are optimistic that such investigations 
could yield additional insights valuable for both theoretical and empirical research.  
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Appendix: Subjects’ Instructions 
 
Insturctions for Experiment 
 
Welcome to today’s experiment!  You will be taking part in a decision making study.  We are interested in your 
decisions that you make on your own. That means, now that the experiment has started, you may not talk to anyone 
except the experimenter.  Please turn off all phones, beepers, and any other electronic devices.  If you talk or 
otherwise communicate with another participant during the experiment, or if an electronic device of yours disturbs 
the experiment, you will be asked to leave and will collect only your show-up bonus.  If you have any questions at 
any time during the experiment, please raise your hand, and we will come to you to answer your question.   
 
VERY IMPORTANT:  If you should experience any software problems at all (a program freeze, a system error 
message, etc.), do not touch the computer.  Do not click to close any system error screens.  Instead, please raise your 
hand, and we will assist you. 
 
When you are finished reading a screen, click the Next button to continue.  
 
For your participation, you will be paid a show-up bonus.  You may earn more money during the course of the 
experiment, as explained in detail below.   The experiment will take about two hours.  Please remain quiet after the 
experiment has concluded. Each of you will be called to the experimenter, one-by-one, to be paid your earnings 
privately. After you have been paid you should exit the lab. 
 
As you proceed through these instructions, there will be a quiz question at the bottom of each page.  You must 
answer the question correctly before going to the next page.  When you finish the instructions, you will play a 
simulated version of the experiment so that you can thoroughly familiarize yourself with the interface. 
 
In this experiment you will be assigned randomly to the role of either candidate or voter.  Two participants will be 
candidates, and the rest will be voters.  Candidates campaign, and at the end of the campaign voters vote. There will 
be several campaigns during the experiment, so there is a chance that you will be both a candidate and a voter (there 
is also a chance that you will be only a voter).  Therefore, during these instructions, you will familiarize yourself 
with both the candidate and the voter interfaces and rules. 
 
Question:  How many participants will be candidates during any given campaign? 
 
A: 1    C: 3 
B: 2    D: varies from campaign to campaign  
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Whether you are a candidate or a voter, you will be randomly assigned to a political party.  This experiment is a two-
party experiment.  The two parties are the Circle Party and the Triangle Party.  One candidate will be a Circle 
candidate, and the other candidate will be an Triangle candidate.  There is an even number of voters, so in each 
campaign half the voters will be Circle party and half will be Triangle party. 
 
You will be randomly reassigned to a party at the beginning of each of the campaigns.  Party assignment will not 
affect your ability to earn payoffs during the experiment. 
 
Question:  If you are a Circle candidate in campaign 1, how many times is it possible for you to be assigned to the 
Circle party in subsequent campaigns? 
A: None   C: 1 
B: No limit  D: 2 
 
A candidate always prefers to have a person from their party elected.  For example, a Circle candidate will always 
prefer to elect a Circle candidate, and a Triangle candidate will always prefer to elect a Triangle candidate. 
 
If you are a voter, there might be circumstances in which you could be better off if the candidate from the other party 
is elected.  For example, if you are assigned to the role of a Triangle voter, then there may arise a situation where 
you would be better off if the Circle candidate won the election. 
 
In addition to the candidates being assigned to a party, they will also be randomly assigned to either Solid or Striped. 
  
 
The amount you earn in this experiment will depend partly on which candidate wins the election. Your earnings 
depend on whether the winning candidate belongs to your party, and whether they are a Solid or Striped candidate. 
You earnings also depend on the campaign decisions of the winning candidate, as described in detail below.  
 
The campaign proceeds as follows.  For 1 minute (marked by a countdown timer in the upper corner of your screen), 
candidates will campaign.  After this, all campaigning will stop, and all participants will vote for their preferred 
candidate.  The voting phase will last for 30 seconds.  Both voters and candidates must vote.   
 
During the campaign phase, voters observe candidates' activity on their computer screens.  Candidates campaign by 
advertising. Each advertisement will reach exactly one voter.  The voter who receives an advertisement is chosen 
randomly, with each voter equally likely to see any advertisement. As a candidate, you might have purchased eight 
advertisements, but this does not necessarily mean you have reached eight unique voters: the same voter can be 





Question: If you are a voter, what is the minimum number of advertisements you will see during the campaign? 
A: 1    C: 0 
B: 3    D: 2 
 
A candidate can advertise only true information about his or her quality.  For example, an advertisement from a 
Triangle-Striped candidate reads as follows: 
 
"You have observed an advertisement from the Triangle candidate who is revealed to be Striped." 
 
An advertisement from a Triangle-Solid candidate will read as follows: 
 
"You have received an advertisement from the Triangle candidate who is revealed to be Solid." 
 
Candidates pay for advertising with tokens.  One token pays for one advertisement.  There are four colors of tokens:  
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 Yellow, Blue, Red and Purple.  Tokens are given to candidates at the beginning of the experiment, and candidates 
may purchase advertisements using any color of token available to them.  Only the individual candidate knows how 
the advertising was purchased.  For example, you are a Triangle candidate, and you purchase one advertisement 
using one Purple token.  Your advertisement will reach one voter, but that voter will not be told that you made the 
purchase with a Purple token. 
 
Question: You are a voter.  In the current campaign, candidates are given Yellow and Blue tokens to use to buy 
advertisements.  You receive an advertisement from a candidate.  What color token was used to purchase the 
advertisement you saw? 
A: Blue                  C: Yellow 
B: Red or Blue    D: Yellow Or Blue 
  
Advertising is always costly to candidates. Each advertisement reduces a candidate's total experimental earnings by 
10 cents.  
 
Q: If you are a candidate, and during the campaign you have used 3 Red tokens and 4 Blue tokens, by how much 
will your earnings be reduced? 
A: $0.70   C: $2.70 
B: $2.00   D: $2.30 
 
Advertisements are costly to voters only if a candidate uses Blue tokens to pay for advertising.   
 
If a candidate is elected, and that candidate has used Blue tokens to pay for advertising, then each voter's 
earnings are reduced by 50 cents  for each Blue token that has been used by the elected candidate.   
 
You are a voter.  If an elected candidate advertised 5 times, and three of those advertisements were purchased with 
Blue tokens, by what amount is each voter's payoff reduced? 
A: $1.00       C: $1.50 
B: $0.50       D: $3.00 
 
A voter’s screen will show the history of all advertisements that have been seen.  You will have information only on 
messages you have received.  You will not know how much either candidate has advertised or which other voters 
have seen advertisements.  
 
At the end of the campaign phase, there will be a 30-second voting period.  All participants must vote, as discussed 
previously.  Whether you are a candidate or a voter, you will see a voting window which allows you to press a 
button corresponding to the candidate you wish to vote for.  When you press the button, a message box will appear 
asking you to confirm your vote.  You will not be able to change your vote once it has been confirmed, nor can you 
vote a second time.  The election results will be shown to all participants.  You will see the results along with your 




Voters’ earnings are calculated in two steps.  
The first step in calculating voters’ earnings is as follows. 
 
* The candidate in your party wins and that candidate is stripes: You earn $7.50. 
 
* The other party’s candidate wins and that candidate is stripes: You earn $7.00. 
 
* Your party’s candidate wins and that candidate is solids: You earn $4.50. 
 
* The other party’s candidate wins and that candidate is solids: You earn $4.00. 
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The second step in calculating voters' earnings is as follows. 
 
If Blue tokens were used by the elected candidate, then each voter's earnings will be reduced by $0.50 per Blue 
token used.  
 
(You may need to use the <Back> button to view the previous screen in answering this question) 
 
Q: You are a Circle voter. A stripes Triangle candidate wins the election, and used six Blue tokens during the 
campaign.  What are your earnings? 
A: $7.00   C: $4.50 






Candidates’ earnings are calculated as follows. Because each candidate wants only their party to win, the first two 
steps are not used to calculate candidates’ earnings.  
 
The first step in calculating candidate’s earnings is as follows. 
 
First, a candidate will earn a bonus of $15 if he/she is elected.   
 
 Also, a candidate’s earnings are reduced by $0.10 for every advertisement that he/she has purchased.  
 
Candidates do not earn any money from tokens that are not used. 
 
Here is an example:  You are a Circle-Striped candidate.  You win the election in a Blue token campaign.  During 
the campaign you use 11 Blue tokens to buy 11 advertisements.  Your earnings are calculated by adding together the 
following:  $15 because you won the election, and -$1.10 ($0.10 * 11) due to the 11 advertisements.  Your earnings 
for the campaign, therefore, are $15 - $1.10 = $13.90. 
 
Here is a second example:  You are a Circle-Solid candidate.  You lose the election in a Red token campaign.  
During the campaign you purchased 1 advertisement.  Your earnings are as follows:  $0 because you did not win the 
election, and -$0.10 due to the 1 advertisement.  Your earnings for the campaign, therefore, are $0 - $0.10 = $-0.10. 
 
While it is possible for you as a candidate to lose money during an individual campaign, your earnings for the 
experiment will be positive. 
 
You have now learned how the entire campaign process works for both voters and for candidates.  There will be 
multiple campaigns in the experiment.  Before each campaign begins, an information screen will be displayed for 
you.  This screen will tell you what tokens are available for the upcoming campaign, whether you are a voter or a 
candidate, your party affiliation, and, if you are a candidate, whether you are stripes or solids.  These characteristics 
will be randomly reassigned each campaign.  At the conclusion of the final campaign, a summary screen will display 
your total earnings including your show-up fee.   
 
Please sit quietly after the experiment has concluded and wait to be called to receive your earnings. 
 
You will now go through three practice screens:  first the Candidate screen, second the Voter screen, and third the 
Voting screen.  Screens will display for 1 minute each.  Practice clicking the different buttons in the window to see 
how the interface works. 
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Expected Number of Ads Received by Number of Ads Sent*
Number of Ads Received
Number of Ads Sent 0 1 2 3 4
0 1 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
1 0 . 9 60 . 0 40 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
2 0 . 9 20 . 0 70 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
3 0 . 8 90 . 1 10 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
4 0 . 8 60 . 1 40 . 0 10 . 0 00 . 0 0
5 0 . 8 20 . 1 60 . 0 10 . 0 00 . 0 0
6 0 . 7 90 . 1 90 . 0 20 . 0 00 . 0 0
7 0 . 7 60 . 2 10 . 0 30 . 0 00 . 0 0
8 0 . 7 30 . 2 30 . 0 30 . 0 00 . 0 0
9 0 . 7 00 . 2 50 . 0 40 . 0 00 . 0 0
10 0.68 0.27 0.05 0.01 0.00
11 0.65 0.29 0.06 0.01 0.00
12 0.62 0.30 0.07 0.01 0.00
13 0.60 0.31 0.08 0.01 0.00
14 0.58 0.32 0.08 0.01 0.00
15 0.55 0.34 0.09 0.02 0.00
16 0.53 0.34 0.10 0.02 0.00
17 0.51 0.35 0.11 0.02 0.00
18 0.49 0.36 0.12 0.03 0.00
19 0.47 0.36 0.13 0.03 0.00
20 0.46 0.37 0.14 0.03 0.01
25 0.38 0.37 0.18 0.06 0.01
30 0.31 0.37 0.21 0.08 0.02
40 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.13 0.05
50 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.18 0.08
* This table shows the expected fraction of voters who will see N ads 
conditional on M ads being sent. For example, when zero ads are sent, then 
100% of voters are expected to see zero ads. When 10 ads are sent, 68% of 
voters are expected to see exactly zero ads, and 5% are expected to see 
exactly two ads. This table was calculated by simulating the advertising 
process according to the specifications described in the body of the text, 
under the assumption that there are 24 voters and two candidates.   CESifo Working Paper Series 
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